Commentary on: Juhani Rudanko\u27s  Identifying a new type of fallacy in political discourse by Kary, David
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 10 
May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM 
Commentary on: Juhani Rudanko's "Identifying a new type of 
fallacy in political discourse" 
David Kary 
Law School Admission Council, Test Development 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Kary, David, "Commentary on: Juhani Rudanko's "Identifying a new type of fallacy in political discourse"" 
(2013). OSSA Conference Archive. 153. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/153 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at 
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized 
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario 
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-4. 
Commentary on: Juhani Rudanko’s “Identifying a new type of 
fallacy in political discourse” 
 
DAVID KARY 
 
Test Development 
Law School Admission Council  
662 Penn St, Newtown, PA, 18940 
USA 
dkary@lsac.org  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Rudanko makes a case for recognizing a new kind of fallacy which he calls ad 
urgentiam. In his words, “ad urgentiam concerns using questionable tactics to 
railroad an audience into agreeing to an initiative without having a chance properly 
to debate the measure and to expose any problems with the measure in the course 
of debate.” Rudanko’s example of an ad urgentiam argument is an excellent one. 
Senator Overman’s argument was part of a well-documented debate, and its context 
can be well-understood. Moreover, the way in which Senator Overman presents his 
case for expediting the debate (and passage) of the Sedition Act of 1918 leaves little 
doubt that Overman is disingenuous in the reasons he gives.  
Though Rudanko locates the ad urgentiam fallacy in political discourse, I 
think we can also recognize this argument type in other areas of discourse. 
Legislatures are not the only forums in which people have much to gain from 
creating an artificial sense of haste in their audience. Consider a classic sales ploy 
that you might hear on a TV infomercial: 
 
If you call to order the Kitchen Logician in the next 30 minutes, we’ll throw in this 
fabulous set of steak knives—a $25 value! Act now! Operators are waiting! 
 
 Rudanko identifies ad urgentiam as a companion piece to the ad socordiam 
argument, which is another purported fallacy. An ad socordiam argument is one in 
which the arguer urges the postponement of a debate or decision and evidently does 
so because he wishes to avoid the possibility of the debate or decision going the 
wrong way.  These argument types are so similar in form—one involves the use of 
questionable tactics to hasten a vote or decision and the other to postpone a vote or 
decision—that I think that Rudanko is right to suggest that ad urgentiam and ad 
socordiam stand or fall together, but I will limit my comments here to ad urgentiam. 
 In the remainder of this commentary, I consider two potential roadblocks to 
Rudanko’s analysis and to his case for recognizing ad urgentiam as a fallacy within 
the tradition of informal logic.  
 
2. CAN FALLACY ATTRIBUTIONS BE BASED ON INFERENCES ABOUT COVERT 
INTENTIONS? 
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Rudanko’s analysis of the ad urgentiam fallacy involves attributing covert intentions 
to arguers. For Rudanko, a key question is the basis on which one might make 
inferences about the intentions of speakers for the purposes of assessing 
fallaciousness. (p. 4) The basis that Rudanko gives—the speaker’s track record, and 
the wider context of the debate—strikes me as fully adequate for this purpose. But 
I’d like to take a step back from this question and raise the issue of whether 
inferences about the speaker’s intentions have a place in the analysis of fallacies.  
 One impulse is to say that fallacy attributions should never rely on inferences 
about speakers’ intentions, but this surely goes too far. It is often crucial to make 
inferences about the speaker’s meaning in the attributing informal fallacies, and 
inferences about the speaker’s intentions undoubtedly play a part in this. Moreover, 
there is at least one instance of what I take to be a “fallacy in good standing” in 
which a fallacy attribution always requires inferences about covert intentions—the 
“veiled-threat” ad baculum. (Woods, 1995, pp. 248-250) 
 The veiled-threat ad baculum is one in which, perhaps for the sake of 
deniability, the perpetrator of an ad baculum argument uses indirect terms to 
present the threat on which the argument rests. For example, if a reputed mobster 
walks into your place of business and says to you, “Although my trash hauling 
company charges higher rates than the competition, I believe you’ll find it in your 
best interests to sign on with my company,” you will probably be able to see that he 
is not merely making a promise of excellent service. An inference about the 
speaker’s intentions is undoubtedly crucial to recognizing that this is an ad baculum 
argument and a fallacy. 
 Most ad baculum arguments, as John Woods argues, are not fallacious; they 
can function as fully cogent prudential arguments “when compliance with their 
conclusions is the best cost-benefit or risk aversion outcome.” (Woods, 1995, p. 250) 
But Woods also argues convincingly that a veiled-threat ad baculum argument can 
be fallacious if it has the effect of misrepresenting prudential reasons as alethic 
reasons. The mobster’s argument, for example can be fallacious if it leads the 
business owner to believe that signing on with the mobster’s trash hauling company 
is not only the most prudent course of action but also a way to achieve good value 
for the money (perhaps because he doesn’t want to think of himself as being 
vulnerable to intimidation). Though it is only a “sometimes” fallacy, the veiled-
threat ad baculum is an instance in which a fallacy attribution depends upon making 
inferences about hidden intentions. 
 Still, a reliance on using speakers’ intentions in identifying fallacies poses a 
problem for the Rudanko’s analysis of ad urgentiam arguments. As Jansen points out 
in a commentary on an earlier paper by Rudanko, one consequence of using 
speakers’ intentions in identifying fallacies is that “the same utterance must be 
judged fallacious when the intention is bad and sound when the intention is good.” 
(Jansen, 2009, p. 2) This consequence is hard to accept in the case of ad urgentiam. 
Imagine that a naïve junior senator was convinced by Senator Overman’s ad 
urgentiam argument and makes the same argument to a colleague, but does so with 
a sincere belief that the impending bond sale is sufficient reason for keeping the 
debate short and with no covert intentions to push the Sedition Act through the 
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Senate. There would be no basis to conclude that the junior senator’s reasons are 
disingenuous, and so the argument is not deemed a fallacy when the junior senator 
makes it but is a fallacy when Senator Overman does. But why should this be so? 
The argument functions the same way in each case. 
 This problem seems inevitable under the “covert intentions” analysis of this 
alleged fallacy, but perhaps it’s possible to find an alternative analysis that focuses 
on the effect that the argument might have on its audience rather than the 
intentions of the speaker. 
 
3. WHERE DOES COGNITIVE ERROR FIT IN? 
 
If we extend our comparison between the veiled-threat ad baculum and ad 
urgentiam, we come upon an important difference. The veiled-threat ad baculum is 
sometimes a fallacy, if you accept Woods’s analysis, because it can induce cognitive 
error. The business owner who rationalizes that the mobster trash hauler will 
provide better service makes one specific cognitive error. A politician who comes to 
believe that a certain policy is ethically right because a veiled threat promises dire 
political consequences if she doesn’t support that policy likewise makes a cognitive 
error.  
But a close look at ad urgentiam arguments shows us that, with respect to the 
central issue of debate, the error that these arguments induce is metacognitive. As 
Rudanko puts it: “The informal fallacy…consists in Overman attempting to deprive 
the Senate of a reasonable opportunity to debate the bill….” (p. 6) The argument 
then, is not an inducement to any particular cognitive error. Not taking enough time 
to consider a serious and complex issue like this one would, however, be a mistake 
in metacognition—a failure to bring about the proper conditions for your best 
cognitive effort.  While metacognitive error can eventually lead to cognitive errors, 
it’s not itself a cognitive error. 
 Likewise when an infomercial offers an inducement for calling in the next 30 
minutes, the goal is to get the customer to act while he’s still under the spell of the 
sales pitch. This is an inducement for the metacognitive error of allowing yourself to 
make a hasty decision. While this metacognitive error might increase the likelihood 
of cognitive error in general, it doesn’t push the customer to any specific cognitive 
error.  
 The question becomes that of whether there can be a fallacy that is not a 
direct inducement to cognitive error. Can an argument be fallacious because it 
induces error at the metacognitive level? My sense is that a direct inducement of 
cognitive error is necessary, but I admit that the issue needs deeper investigation. 
Though I’m not convinced that ad urgentiam should be recognized as a 
fallacy, I don’t think this takes much away from its importance as an argument type. 
Self-serving arguments aimed at convincing others to shorten debate or reach a 
quick decision are too widespread not to merit our attention. Even if they are not 
fallacies, they can still be denounced for the ethically questionable tactics they 
exhibit and the suspect motivations they reveal. Moreover, this type of argument 
does have a prominent place in political discourse, which Rudanko capably 
investigates, and this adds to its importance. (In this regard, we could add that ad 
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urgentiam arguments are often used in a justificatory role for invoking 
parliamentary procedures that bring debate to an early end and for shuffling the 
order of items on legislative agendas.) Fallacy or not, there is much to be gained 
from the study of these arguments, and Rudanko’s paper is a welcome contribution. 
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